Enter the so-called "Y2K" computer problem. Even though the problem was all fuse and no bang, we became quite aware of our reliance on technology. With widespread dependence comes strategic vulnerability. Therefore, a critical need exists for a strong national defense to protect these vulnerabilities. Conversely, the ability to access this vulnerability in potential adversaries makes the Information "Instrument of Power" a formidable tool for advancing US interests.
The Department of Defense is working diligently on Information Operations on many levels and within each service branch. The goal of this paper is not to criticize these tremendous efforts, but rather to discuss a serious concern about our military's structural ability to manage this dynamic vulnerability.
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Abstract
The world is growing. Obviously not in terms of geography, but rather in the "information" dimension. Populations, economies, and individual opportunity are each growing at rates unprecedented in the human experience. With this growth, the worldwide lust for information makes it a most powerful and necessary commodity. This study uses open source, unclassified information as a means to consider our current IO posture. However, the very nature of this material, and the inherent security requirements encasing some information on the subject, places significant constraints upon this study. 
IO, as an Act of War
With such global reliance on information functions, it is easy to understand defensive IO. 
Considering IO as a "Place"
As shown above, Information Operations raise issues, concerns, and opportunities relevant to the way the United States defends itself. What, then, are the areas appropriate for the US Department of Defense's involvement in IO? Considering IO to exist in a "place," as some suggest, may help to answer this question. Obviously not a place in the traditional sense of the term because information, and therefore IO, is not geographically constrained. Consider, instead, IO as a place more analogous to cyber-space. We might even call it "Informationspace" or "info-space" for short. Envisioning IO in this manner allows us to specify a portion of info-space as a "battlespace" where DOD can conduct offensive and defensive actions to support more traditional, geographic battlespace(s) or Area(s) of Operation (AO).
Literature Review
The US government demonstrates a great deal of concern over the protection of cyber-based information systems and certain critical infrastructures. In May 1998, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), entitled "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection." This directive states:
Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, both governmental and private. Many of the nation's critical infrastructures have historically been physically and logically separate systems that had little interdependence. As a result of advances in information technology and the necessity of improved efficiency, however, these infrastructures have become increasingly automated and interlinked. These same advances have created new vulnerabilities to equipment failures, human error, weather and other natural causes, and physical and cyber-attacks. Addressing these vulnerabilities will necessarily require flexible, evolutionary approaches that span both the public and private sectors, and protect both domestic and international security.
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The President established a national goal that by May 2003, the US will achieve and maintain the protection of critical infrastructures from intentional acts. PDD 63 cites three specific critical functional areas for protection. First, the Federal Government must be capable of performing essential national security missions and ensure the general public health and safety. Second, state and local governments must be able to maintain order and deliver minimum essential public services. Lastly, the private sector must have the ability to ensure orderly functioning of the economy and deliver telecommunication, energy, financial, and transportation services.
PDD 63 establishes a structure and directs specific Lead Agencies for "Sector Liaison" and 
IO in the Private Sector

Issues and Analysis
Information Operations span space, time, economies, borders, and people. While this has always been true, IO themselves are critical activities in today's "Information Age." This results from our insatiable thirst for increases in information exchange velocity, accuracy, and quantity.
Information thirst drives technological evolution, which causes even greater thirst. As this snowballing cycle gains mass and velocity, the direction it takes may depend on how people of the United States, through their political leadership, decide to engage in IO. The issue at hand for DOD centers upon establishing a command structure that best supports future national defense tasking. Consideration of current national policy, critical infrastructure defense, legal issues, and expected military uses of IO helps address this important issue.
National Policy
Our national policies help "set the table" for both public and private concerns to gather and prepare against expected threats. Growing potential vulnerabilities resulting from Information Age developments help bring diverse guests to this table. DOD has a permanent seat here and must be able to interact with private sector companies and other government agencies. This seat must be occupied and supported by the proper military organization because ability to interact appropriately is vital to national defense and future military IO. Without these abilities, DOD may fail for two reasons. First, DOD could not effectively fulfill its PDD 63 mandated role of assisting federal agencies and the private sector with implementation of best practice standards.
Second, in times of crisis DOD will be supported by other agencies. The military representative must be capable of determining, and coordinating, resource and action requirements. Effective response to crisis demands the shortest appropriate decision cycle to achieve Information Superiority over an opponent. Military representation not empowered to make decisions, allocate resources, or demand National Security Council direct attention undermines DOD's ability to fulfill this critical responsibility.
Critical Infrastructure Defense
National critical infrastructures are both physical and cyber-based systems essential to minimum operations of the economy and government. Defense of these infrastructures requires both physical and cyber-based attention. While issues such as Y2K increase awareness of the cyber aspect, thus far the US has fortunately avoided physical attack. Many of the critical infrastructures are privately held. For example, various companies and co-ops own much of the nation's power grid. Do these private concerns have adequate physical security to protect the grid? If not, can cyber control of the entire grid be gained through an unprotected remote node?
Defense of a critical infrastructure may be only as strong as its weakest link. DOD has arguably the strongest skill set available for assisting with the establishment and maintenance of viable physical and cyber-based security for publicly or privately held national critical infrastructures.
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The ability to develop and draw these skills together in peace or conflict requires DOD to invest adequate power and authority in IO command and control. This IO command and control, along with the critical need to prepare both deliberate and crisis response plans are compelling reasons to establish an IO CINC.
Legal and Ethical Issues
IO is awash with legal and ethical issues. Not surprising in a society that properly holds individual rights and privacy as sacred tenets. Existing law, however, often lacks applicability in the IO realm. New law will germinate as IO-related ethical issues evolve.
Any government agency engaged in gathering information on people or their private activities may soon find civil or criminal lawsuits and testimony to Congress dominating their agenda. DOD must avoid this entanglement, particularly given law enforcement limits imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. Under the interpretations of this act, the military may only assist US civilian law enforcement authorities. Despite this, future situations may develop where the President directs DOD to be the "supported agency" during time of crisis to national critical infrastructures. Then DOD may have to direct law enforcement activities against US citizens. DOD awareness of potential IO legal issues is essential to establishing Information Superiority.
Pre-planning at the strategic level can prevent inadvertent legal or ethical violations.
IO as an Instrument of Power
IO concerning other governments or non-state agents is another issue of growing concern.
Information is considered an Instrument of Power (IOP). Information Operations embody how states use this IOP. The great Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu some 2,500 years ago recognized the importance and power of IO in his stratagem of using the "Sheathed Sword" to triumph without fighting. He considered this the highest form of "generalship." We can draw two inferences from Sun Tzu's wisdom. First, IO as an IOP can allow a military to prevail during conflict. As the national leadership generates national objectives and a national security strategy to pursue them, the leadership will also devise--or modify--the military instrument of national power as a component of national security strategy. This strategy takes the form of objectives for the development of broad military capabilities, their worldwide posture, and their functional and geographic orientation. In the event of armed conflict, this strategy will take the form of military objectives for the establishment of military conditions essential to support national security objectives and terminate the conflict on terms favorable to US interests. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. Joint Publication 0-2 states each CINC has the Combatant Command (COCOM) authority necessary to, "ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands." This gives them several powers including Planning, Programming, Budget System (PPBS) input, assignment of subordinate commanders, and relations with DOD agencies. Joint Publication 0-2 also states, "The combatant commanders are responsible for the development and production of joint operation plans. During peacetime, they act to deter war and prepare for war by planning for the transition to war and military operations other than war. During war, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions."
These powers align well with responsibilities placed upon DOD by PDD 63. 
Principle Conclusions and Recommendation
Information itself is virtually a Center of Gravity (COG) in the military sense of the term. Is it time for an "IO CINC?" If DOD is to shape, respond, and prepare for future IO at home, abroad, and in "info-space," the answer is a resounding "YES." Only a Unified Command responsible for Information Operations could provide the vision, span of control, and resource horsepower our nation deserves for the defense of critical infrastructures, and for the development of IO doctrine to focus DOD resources. Only an IO CINC can provide regional CINCs the rapid response capability needed for modern crisis response operations. Finally, only an IO CINC could adequately manage future threats residing only in "info-space" or cyberspace. Gaining Information Superiority against such a threat will not involve drawing lines on a map or most other traditional warfare constraints. Our nation demands the military be capable of full spectrum defense. Doing this day in and day out requires an IO superstructure well above the JFC "cell" level.
Adding IO responsibilities to an existing CINC, such as US Space Command, may seem an attractive alternative to establishment of a totally new Unified Command. While this option may yield savings in infrastructure and manpower, it fails to recognize the truly unique focus and skill-sets needed to conduct IO. US Space Command, for example, may indeed be able to support and conduct many present-day Information Operations. However, US Space
Command's focus is, appropriately, space. Fitting IO into this structure could restrict DOD's ability to conduct successful offensive and defensive Information Operations in the future. We cannot afford this restriction given the asymmetric threat potential inherent in IO.
Implications
Expanding the Unified Command structure to include an IO CINC has many implications.
The most restrictive of these is, of course, dollars. Constructing such an IO superstructure would be very expensive. However, we can be certain that potential adversaries are currently making this very investment. To quote Sun Tzu, "Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory that is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition, simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluents, is the height of inhumanity." The ancient philosopher is talking about investing in information. While Information Operations have changed over the last 2500 years, the wisdom of this philosophy has not.
